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accur~tP.

(R. 182)

On or about December 17, 1982, the Applicant, through her
counsel, filed a "Petition for Consideration of Permanent-Total
Disability and Reimbursement of Medi cal
a finding of permanent and total

Expenses".

She requestea

disability as well as an

accounting of the reimbursed medical expenses paid by her husban 1
and Medicare.

(R. 161)

The Applicant sustained a low back injury on October 31,
1961, while employed by defendant, Eitel

McCullough, Inc. (R. 11

As a result of the injury, she received temporary-total
disability benefits commencing the day of her injury and
continuing for 82 weeks and two days thereafter.
work on September 19, 1963.

She returned

On or about October 14, 1963, the

Applicant filed an Application for Physical

Examination by a

Medi cal Advisory Board, which was the predecessor of the present
Disability Rating Panel. (R. 25).

On January 25, 1964, the

Applicant was examined by the Advisory Board and found to have
sustained a 20% permanent-partial

impairment of the whole body

due to her back injury of October 31, 1961. (R. 32)
She was again examined by the Advisory Medical
April 4, 1964, and the original

findings confirmed.

Panel on
The

Commission advised the Applicant she would receive 40 weeks ot
permanent-partial

impairment benefits commencing September 26,

1963, and would be paid until

a total of $1 ,560.00 had been paid.

-3«"- 34).
, 0 ,,nsel,

On or about May 4, 1964, the Applicant, through her
filed a Petition for Rehearing with the Commission,

cld: 111 1ng the permanent-partial

impairment found by the Medical

Advisory Board, was without evidentiary foundation.

(R. 36).

The Commission treated the Petition as one for an Application for
F0 rm al Hear i n g •

A hear i n g was he l d on September l 3, l 9 6 5.

She

was sent to a Medical Advisory Board for further physical
examination on October 16, 1965. (R. 78).

She was examined by

the Board and found to have a 20% permanent-partial
the whole body.

impairment of

Because of an objection, she was required to

return to the Medical Advisory Board on November 20, 1965, and,
at that time, the Board recommended that the file be referred to
a 111 e d i c a l p a ne l •

Sh e n ow wa s c l a i mi n g p s y c h i at r i c e x p e n s e s •

On December 2, 1965, Commissioner Wiesley appointed Dr. Boyd
G. Holbrook as chairman of the medical

panel and also associated

Dr. Wayne M. Hebertson, Dr. Jack Tedro and Dr. Chester B. Powell
as members of the panel.
panel report was received.

On or about February 21, 1966, the
It indicated that the Applicant's

psychiatric treatment, medications and hospitalization were the
primary result of an independent process rather than attributable
to the industrial

accident. (R. 109).

Her 20% disability rating

neretofore given the Applicant by two prior medical advisory

'"'er d s

wa s a f f i rm e d •

'he mh11cal
"~June b,

panel

The App 1 i cant t hen f i 1 e d an object i on t o

report and a hearing was held on the objections

1966. (R. 122).

The Commission thereafter entered its

Order of August 3, 1966, finding that there was no apparent

-4-

change in the testimony of the panel

chairmen and that thP

Applicant had submitted no new testimony.

(R. 136).

The

Commission further found that the Applicant was entitled to
receive from the defendants 40 weeks of compensation totaling
$1,560.00, all of which had heretofore been paid.

The Order

J:;,,

indicates that the Applicant was paid compensation to and
including December, 1964.
On July 6, 1970, the Commission received an Application fc•
Hearing filed by the Applicant indicating that defendants had
refused to pay any and all

benefits in that they had refused to

pay medical expenses. (R. 144).

On July 10, 1970, Judge Peter

Marthakis, II, informed the Applicant, by mail, that she should
file an Application for Additional

Benefits instead of requestinc

a hearing and enclosed the proper forms for her to use.
(R. 145).

He also directed the applicant to Paragraph 6 of the

forms providing:
Applicant alleges a substantial change in her physical
condition and requires additional medical, hospital and
compensation benefits based on the fol lowing change: (Note,
it is absolutely essential that this allegation be supporte:
by current medical reports from treating physicians
indicating) :
a. The present disability is greater than the disability
stated in part (B) of Paragraph four.
b. The higher disability is due to the accident stated
Paragraph (l) above.
c. Additional medical, hospital and treatment is
required because of the accident stated in Paragrah (1)
above. This matter will not be set for hearing or other
action taken until this report is filed.

ir,

-5l·Jllowing this letter from Judge Marthakis, nothing further
;/11

1

s rec

el

ved from the Applicant Lint i l December, 1982. (R. 161)
ARGUMENT
POINT I

The record shows as a matter of law, that based upon Section
.\o-1-99 Utah Code Annotated and the decision of this Court in the
case of Beverly R. Buxton v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 587
'2d 121, the claim of the Applicant is barred by the Statute of
Limitations:
At the last hearing of the above matter on April 27, 1983,
the attorney representing the Applicant admitted that no medical
bills or information of any kind had ever been submitted to any
of the respondent-defendants for their approval, payment or
otnerwise, and to this day, none have been received.

The

Applicant, through her counsel, sought to characterize the July
6, I 9 70 f i l i n g as t i me l y for the purpose of ob ta i n i n g permanent total disability benefits.

As pointed out in the Memorandum

r1ecis-1nn of the Administrative Law Judge:

However, counsel's reasoning in this regard is flawed in
certain respects.
First, the filing of July 6, 1970, was
not timely in any form or fashion.
The file clearly
indicates that the Applicant last received any compensation
from the defendants in December, 1964.
Pursuant to 35-1-99,
Utah Code Annotated, as amended, effective May 9, 1961,
provided that a claim for compensation must be filed in
thr~e years from the date of the accident or the last date
or µayment.
In the instant manner, the last payment was
nade in December, l 964, and accordingly, Mrs. Mecham' s claim
'hould have been filed no later than December, 1967.
In the
alternative, if we apply the six-year Statute of Limitations
found in Section 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated, as amended
Mdy ·j, 1981, the Applicant's claim of July 6, 1970, was
still not timely in that, if the injury occurred on October
31 , 1 'l 6 l , s i x ye a rs f r om t hat date wo u 1 d have been 0 ct ob er
31, 1967, which is three years earlier than the Applicant's
filing of 1970.
(R. 184)
1

-6The judge then correctly concluded that by virtue of thP
statute, cited above, and the decision of this Court in the cas;
of Beverly Buxton v.

Industrial

Commission of Utah,

her cl aim for permanent di s ab i l i t y i s barred •

587 P2a 1?1,

The Court

correctly held that the only Limitations of Actions Statute,
which has application to permanent-total

disability claims is

Section 99 of the Act.
The facts in the instant case clearly reflect that the
Applicant should have made application for permanent-total
disability benefits and filed the same no later than December,

1967, which would have been three years from the last payment of
compensation or within three years from the date of the accident,
which would have been October 31, 1964.

Obviously, as pointed

out by the Administrative Law Judge, the later date is the one'"
be utilized and even giving the Applicant the benefit of the
doubt with regard to the July 6, 1970 filing,

it was clear that

her filing was three years too late for the purpose of
maintaining her claim for total
Inasmuch as no medical

disability.

expenses had ever been submitted to

the defendants for review nor were they supported by any record
as such, the Court appropriately indicated to the Applicant that
as far as medical

expenses were concerned, there was nothing

before the Administrative Law Judge for consideration.
The judge then appropriately pointed out to counsel
Applicant, that before any additional
an issue in additional

proceedings,

medical

for;'••

expenses were made

he should review the Medical

-7!'.inPI

Report of February 21, 1966, which specifically found:
Under these circumstances it would appear that the
psychiatric treatment, medications and hospitalizations are
primarly the result of an independent process rather than
attributable to this alleged accident.
To this date, no medical expenses or claims for medical

expenses have ever been presented to the defendants.
CONCLUSION
A review of the record, which is very ably summarized in the
findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the
Administrative Law Judge dated May 10, 1983, clearly reflects
that the Applicant's position cannot be maintained and that her
claim is barred by the Statute of Limitations as ex plained in the
Buxton decision heretofore cited.
The Order of the Commission should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this ____day of June,

1984.

Wallace R. Lauchnor
Attorney for Eitel McCullough,
Inc. and Fidelity Casualty Co.
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